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Abstract

From the work of Pierre Bourdieu on symbolic violence came the study of epistemic violence, which is at the core
of the process of othering marginalized groups. Epistemological scholars including Kristie Dotson, Miranda Fricker,
Cynthia Townley, and Gayatri Spivak have done extensive work on the theory of the phenomenon; it is necessary
to analyze the classifications of epistemic violence through their application in empirical settings. Addressing three
case studies of “othering” highlights the importance of greater integration of marginalized groups into the education
system as the necessary first step towards eliminating othering by targeting epistemic violence at a base level.

Introduction

The purpose of this manuscript is
to investigate the use of epistemic
violence in the process of othering
through the analysis of empirical
case studies. Beginning with the
origins of epistemic violence, the
following sections will analyze how
key concepts of epistemic violence
have been applied in three real-world
cases. These case studies were chosen
to represent three different types of
othering: ethnic, in the case of the
Romani people; religious, in the case
of the Saudi Shiites; and the othering of a socially-constructed group,
presented in the case of India’s Dalit
caste. To conclude, I argue that in
order for epistemic violence to be
remedied, there must first be greater
integration of othered persons into
the educational system. For the
purposes of this manuscript, I define
the ‘Other’ as the out-group: those
that are marginalized by a larger
portion of the population and who
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often maintain limited rights within
society. Epistemic, here, refers to
knowledge and the measure of its
validation. When discussing terms
such as ‘epistemic agent’ and ‘epistemic responsibility’, this definition
should be taken into account for a
thorough understanding.
The importance of understanding epistemic violence is twofold. First, to be able to recognize
the process of othering as it unfolds
in societies today and second,
through understanding the process,
we may come closer to formulating a
solution to combat this process and
its outcomes. Finding a solution is a
necessary goal in order to incorporate minorities into the greater population, and allow them a legitimized
voice and the status of respected and
trusted epistemic agents – producers
of knowledge.

Symbolic Power,
Epistemic Violence

In the mid-20th century,
sociologist and intellectual Pierre
Bourdieu introduced the concept
of symbolic power as it exists in
modern societies. For Bourdieu, this
was a ‘worldmaking power’ (Swartz,
1997), giving those holding the power the ability to impose their vision
of the social world, and its divisions,
as legitimate. From this theory came
that of symbolic violence. Bourdieu
understood this to be synonymous
with ideology, as having the ability
“to impose the means for comprehending and adapting to the social
world by representing economic and
political power in disguised, taken-for-granted forms” (Swartz, 1997,
89). Expanding on his belief that all
actions have a purpose, those with
social power use this power to establish and impose norms through misrecognition – the disguising of the
economic and political interests driv-

Discriminatory

Discriminatory epistemic violence occurs primarily through the
dehumanization of the out-group.
In its most basic form, this is the
construction of the Other. This often
arises when the in-group perceives
the out-group to be inferior, both
essentially and morally, thus casting
them as subhuman and thus not
necessarily included in the majority’s
realm of moral considerations (Maoz
& McCauley, 2008). In doing this,
persons are “excluded from being
human, refused reciprocity and

excluded from intelligibility” (Rawls
& David, 2003, 494). Discriminatory epistemic violence is often the
first to be exercised as it creates the
base – the Other – and is frequently
used by those in power as a stepping
stone to garner majority support
for policies of separation from the
Other. For example, the segregation
laws that were in place to delineate
India’s Dalit caste developed through
political motions that deemed them
untouchable. Seen strongly in the
us-versus-them rhetoric of political
leaders, this type of epistemic violence is spread through media and
leaves, throughout history, an intergenerational legacy of maintaining
the constructed and separate Other.

Testimonial

Testimonial epistemic violence comes in two forms: reduced
credibility and silencing. When credibility is reduced through epistemic
violence, prejudice operates on the
part of the listener to discredit the
information they are receiving from
the Other, despite any expertise they
may have (Fricker, 2006). To engage
in a successful linguistic exchange,
the speaker must find reciprocity
in their audience; the audience
must understand the words and
understand the intention behind
those words (Dotson, 2011). The
audience, in this case the in-group,
effectively fails to recognize the
speaker as a knower. Nancy Tuana
discusses this as being “ignorance
produced by the construction of epistemically disadvantaged identities”
(Dotson, 2011, 243), which occurs
when groups are understood only
by their constructed and circulated
stereotypes. The refusal to acknowledge an actor’s contributions to the
broader epistemic community, or to
bar them from it altogether, impairs
their epistemic agency.

Silencing is discussed at
length by Gayatri Spivak (1988) in
her text “Can the Subaltern Speak?”
and defined as the damage to a
group’s ability to speak and to be
heard. Often, this is most prevalent
in instances of physical harm from
the in-group against the out-group.
It becomes difficult for a member
of the out-group to report crimes
when institutions are run entirely
by the in-group. Also referred to as
testimonial smothering, this occurs
when the speaker from the outgroup truncates their testimony “in
order to insure that the testimony
contains only content for which
[the] audience demonstrates testimonial competence” (Dotson, 2011,
p. 244). Another aspect of silencing
occurs when a group is put at a disadvantage because of their exclusion
from participating in the creation of
social meanings (Fricker, 2013). This
exclusion makes it difficult for them
to understand significant portions of
their social experience.
The profound negative
effects of testimonial epistemic
violence are recognized by several
scholars: Miranda Fricker (2013)
notes the harm that it inflicts on intellectual courage; Cynthia Townley
(2006) addresses the impairment of
epistemic agency; and Patricia Hill
Collins discusses the damage caused
to the intellectual traditions of entire
groups (Dotson, 2011). The extent
to which entire populations can be
denied linguistic reciprocation institutes epistemic violence.
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ing these practices. Stemming from
the concept of symbolic violence is
epistemic violence, which focuses on
the discourse involved in the practice of othering. Othering, to this
effect, is the marginalization of those
who are distinctly different from the
majority ‘us’, and uses differences
between beliefs and customs to define them as the out-group (Rawls &
David, 2003). Traditionally, societies
have used the discourse of otherness
to create a common bond within the
in-group for example, feelings of patriotism or nationalism. Often in an
asymmetrical conflict in which one
group has markedly more symbolic
power, the powerful will exercise this
power through epistemic violence
(Maoz & McCauley, 2008). The discursively-produced sense of division
that follows deeply and negatively
affects the oppressed and often leads
to physical violence and conflict.
I have classified epistemic
violence into three separate categories: discriminatory, testimonial, and
distributive. Each presents a distinct
way that epistemic violence is exercised by the in-group in the process
of othering. These categories help
to better describe different discursive aspects of epistemic violence by
highlighting each explicitly.

Distributive

It is important to recognize
that the damage caused by epistemic
violence are rarely confined to specifically epistemic matters (Dotson,
2011). Often, harm spills over into
more material aspects. Distributive
epistemic violence refers to the re12
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fusal of resources for the out-group.
In particular, the lack of education
both in and about marginalized
communities is damaging to all
parties involved. Denial of education can often be in the form of
structural violence, which frequently
accompanies distributive epistemic
violence, as the two are functionally
connected. The perception of these
communities as undereducated
only further divides them from the
in-group and prevents them from
engaging in and contributing to the
larger epistemic community. A lack
of educational instruction in a common language also serves to keep the
out-group marginalized from participation in society.
There is often also a lack of
proper education about the outgroup; it is either inaccurate or
absent entirely. This contributes to
pernicious ignorance which “follows
from a predictable epistemic gap in
cognitive resources” (Dotson, 2011,
238). The resulting state of reliable
ignorance ensures that members of
the in-group will consistently fail to
track certain truths and to investigate claims about the out-group.
It can be said that an important determinant of state-executed
violations of human rights, especially
in democratic states such as India, is
public support (Maoz & McCauley,
2008). In modern, progressive societies, there is the question of how
leaders are able to convince citizens
that an entire group or culture is
worthy of discrimination. Economist
Edward Glaeser looks in particular
at the propagation of group-level
hatred as the bases for this, proposing that it arises from stories manufactured by “entrepreneurs of hate”
(Glaeser, 2005, 46). Most commonly, in-group power figures such
as politicians and corporations, will
emphasize stories of out-group crime
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to make them seem more frequent
and heinous. Hatred is a primitive
emotion which “marks for attack
or avoidance those things which we
perceive as a threat to our survival or
reproduction” (Glaeser, 2005, 50).
Its formation involves a cognitive
process in which the evidence found
in the propagated stories is processed
into a belief that a person is inherently evil. The cognitive error occurs
when one takes the assumption of
evil about a specific person, then
applies it inferentially to the entire
group.
Comparable to the adage,
“if you repeat a lie often enough,
it becomes the truth”, the power
of these stories in the public comes
not from their accuracy, but from
repetition. Using a cost-benefit
analysis similar to an economic model, Glaeser (2005) concludes that
people will only investigate the truth
behind the stories if they perceive
private benefits in learning the facts.
These stories are complemented by
policies that limit contact with the
minority, isolating them further.
Glaeser (2005) developed a model to track this process, beginning
with politicians deciding whether to
broadcast a hate-creating message.
These messages create signals to
members of the in-group about the
harmfulness of the minority. They
will decide whether or not to investigate the truth behind the stories,
then to engage in self-protection
by supporting policies of exclusion.
This string of events is particularly
likely to be seen when out-groups
are both politically relevant and
socially segregated (Glaeser, 2005).
This aligns with Bourdieu’s concept
of misrecognition (Swartz, 1997)
as the imposition of certain policies
relies directly on disguising them as a
means of protecting the in-group.
To further illuminate the use of

epistemic violence in the process of
othering, I will discuss three specific instances in which it has been
employed in recent history. Each
will focus on a different type of outgroup and will analyze the use of the
types of epistemic violence described
above. In all three cases, the effects
can still be seen today.

Case Study: Ethnic Othering

The Romani people are an
ethnic group known to many by the
exonyms ‘gypsy’ or ‘cigány’. Collectively, they make up 3 to 5% of
the population of Eastern Europe
and Spain. 18th century Western
scientists have traced their genetic
heritage to parts of northern India,
though the Romani are traditionally
a nomadic people. As a consequence
of their lack of a bordered country
or homeland, Romanis have suffered
broad persecution and discrimination. In early modern Europe, Romani were known to be blacksmiths
and musicians, both of which were
‘infamous’ professions considered
to be polluting or socially dangerous (Darity, Jr. ed., 2008). Their
oppression was particularly harsh
during the Inquisition in Spain and
in territories of the Holy Roman
Empire, at which time they were
expelled from Spain, France, and
German-speaking countries. Policies
in European countries during the
18th and 19th centuries were largely
driven by concerns that “they represented a hard-to-identify, unsettled
population” (Darity, Jr. ed., 2008,
278) of thieves and heretics.
During the Third Reich,
their persecution intensified after
Adolf Hitler registered the entire
German Romani population before
deporting more than two-thirds
of them to camps in the occupied
east. Seen as a genetic contaminant
threatening the gene pool of Hitler’s

are abusive and have strongly negative implications. The term ‘gypsy’
conjures an image of a fictional
persona: a romanticized, wandering
band of thieves with a penchant for
the supernatural and fortune-telling.
Before their genetic origins were discovered, Romani were even thought
to have come from such fantastic
places as Atlantis, Nubia, and the
Moon (Hancock, 2005). These gaps
in Westerners’ knowledge about the
Romani people were filled easily
by politicians casting them as dirty,
reprehensible villains in a striking
example of discriminatory epistemic
violence. Still today, despite the presence of two young Romani members
of the European Parliament, prejudice is evident. In former communist
countries in particular, governments
suffer from a type of ‘policy schizophrenia’ under which ethnicization
of public policy is encouraged across
the board, yet the ‘Roma problem’
is represented as an issue of national
security (Darity, Jr. ed., 2008). These
governments play to the public’s
fears of a demographic explosion of
the minority coupled with a demographic collapse of the majority.
Not only have they continued to be faced with discrimination,
but the Romani people have also
suffered as a result of testimonial
epistemic violence in the form of
silencing. This was of particular
importance throughout the course
of the Nuremburg Trials after World
War II. Held by the Allied forces,
this series of military tribunals tried
leaders of the Third Reich for their
crimes against humanity. Despite the
large number of Romani massacred
across the occupied territories, there
was no recognition of German violence against them, nor were Romani
bodies empowered to speak out for
reparation. It is important to recognize this fact, as it is vital that “in-

Social Sciences

‘master race’ (Hancock, 2005),
Romanis were the only group besides
the Jews that were ordered to be
exterminated unconditionally. Sterilization programs, mass deportations,
and systematic massacres led to the
deaths of over 100,000 Romani. This
was between half and three-fourths
of their total population in Nazi-occupied Europe.
Most times, ethnic groups
are marginalized due to a perceived
threat. In the case of the Romani,
this stemmed from their lifestyle.
In many newspapers, their arrival
has been referred to as an ‘invasion’
(Hancock, 2005), and their lack
of a native country has only added
to their reputation as outsiders,
especially in countries where “nationality is judged more by one’s
ethnicity than passport” (Hancock,
2005, 921). Their nomadic culture
was thought to be representative of
loose, transient morals. It has also
been acknowledged that the Asian
component of Romani heritage has
proved to be “an overriding factor in
the pervasive discrimination against
them” (Hancock, 2005, 921). Particularly during what would come to be
called the Romani Holocaust, those
with large amounts of symbolic
power relied on methods of discriminatory epistemic violence to cast
the Romani people as a threat to the
greater good of society by propagating stories of their immorality and
penchant for crime. The self-imposed separateness of Romanis
further lowers the perceived benefit
within the in-group of investigating
these stories, and a self-perpetuating
cycle of stigma, marginalization, unemployment, illiteracy, and poverty
becomes increasingly unbreakable.
The othering of the Romani
people is evident even in the language used to describe them; the
exogeneous terms ‘gypsy’ and ‘cigány’

stitutional bodies to whom citizens
may need to contest must, on pain
of facilitating domination, achieve
epistemic justice in their hearings”
(Fricker, 2013, 1326).

Case Study: Religious
Othering

In the Middle East, many
conflicts are based on the stark
division between Sunni and Shia
Muslims. This ancient religious
divide has been the fuel behind a
resurgence of clashes in Muslim
countries. Struggles between Sunni
and Shia forces powered a Syrian
civil war that threatens to alter the
regional map, spurred violence that
is shattering Iraq, and widened fractures in a number of Gulf countries.
Growing sectarian conflicts have
also stimulated the revitalization of
transnational jihadi networks that
pose a threat to the global political
sphere. Islam’s schism, seething for
fourteen centuries, is an issue that
has arisen again and again. Though
in several Muslim nations there is a
Shia majority, they make up only 10
to 15% of the population of Saudi
Arabia. As the minority, they face
discrimination under the absolute
monarchy that has ruled the country
since its establishment.
Saudi Arabia is often thought
to be the leader of the Sunni world
as a religious state which derives
its legitimacy from a form of Islam
which is almost definitively anti-Shiite, and throughout history,
the “Shiites have paid the price of
the Saudi family’s quest for religious
legitimacy” (Teitelbaum, 2010, 2).
Wahhabi and Salafi ideology teaches
an intolerance of any other interpretations of Islam and therefore refuse
to bless any greater integration of
Shiites into religious and political
society (Beranek, 2009). The proclamations of radical clerics have cast
14
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Shiites as polytheists and non-believers. In the 18th and 19th centuries,
Shia persecution reached a climax
when many important religious
shrines were destroyed by Sunni
Muslims in the cities of Mecca and
Medina (Commins, 2006). In the
early 20th century, zealous warriors
of the Ikhwan insisted that Wahhabi
ideals should prevail in domestic
politics and forced conversion of
many Shiites. Shia religious leaders
were gathered and vowed to cease
observance of Shia religious holidays,
shut down their places of worship,
and stop pilgrimages to holy sites
(Commins, 2006).
Though in reality the minority does not pose a threat to the
Saudi state, their treatment is greatly
influenced by the recent rise of Iran
and Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon.
The Saudi government fears this will
empower their own Shia population. Pressure from Wahhabi ulama
serve only to further this as they lead
clerics to publish anti-Shiite fatwas,
sanctioning their killing (Teitelbaum, 2010). Along with the presence of Shiites in some oil-rich areas,
the two sects coexist in a climate of
asymmetric violence in Saudi Arabia
in which there is increased support
within the stronger party for retaliatory aggression against that which
is more vulnerable. The perceived
threat of a Shia uprising is cause for
support of aggressive and belligerent
retaliatory policies, as is often the
case when there is an alleged collective threat (Maoz & McCauley,
2008).
The official statement given
by the Saudi government posits that
while they do not believe Shiites
should be killed, expelled, or converted by violence, they should
“renounce their fallacious beliefs
voluntarily and embrace the right
path of Islam” (Beranek, 2009, 5).
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After their forced conversion by the
Ikhwan, Wahhabi ulama took over
teaching and preaching positions
at the remaining Shia mosques,
and so the dogma of polytheistic,
non-believing Shiites has for many
years been a part of official school
curriculum (Teitelbaum, 2010).
In this way, the othering of Shia
Muslims continues to be discursively
produced through the construction
and propagation of knowledge in
the educational system under all
three methods of epistemic violence.
Because of the influence that this
has had on many generations of
students, Shia Muslims continue to
be the victims of violence, attacks,
mass killings, bombings, and the
destruction of homes and religious
shrines. They remain discriminated
against in the workforce and have
very little socio-economic mobility.
We can also see an erosion of many
Shia epistemic traditions over time
due to the silencing of their religious
practices and teachings.

Case Study: Othering of a
Socially Constructed Group

Not all out-groups are as
easily classified as the Other based
on differences in ethnicity or religion; there exist groups which are
outwardly much the same as the majority, yet still face persecution as the
out-group. One widely applied and
frequently contested model for systems of birth-attributed rank is that
of caste, originating from the example unique to India where the jati
is the standard for societal division.
Jati in India refers to interdependent,
hierarchical, birth-attributed groups.
This socially-stratified system divides
communities into hereditary groups
and has long been considered to
be “one of the pillars of the Hindu
social order in India” (Lerner, Lerner
& Lerner, 2006, 396). Important

to this system are the concepts of
purity and pollution, which govern
intrapersonal relationships including food, occupation, marriage, and
religious rituals.
Under this hierarchical system, the upper castes are privileged
and rewarded, while the lowest caste
– Dalit – are excluded from their
surrounding communities. During
their colonial rule, the British took
advantage of this system, imposing
policies which favored the upper
castes and solidifying its power over
Indian society (Iyer, 2009). It was
primarily during the 19th century
that Dalit began to be referred to as
‘Untouchables’, at which time they
were denied basic civil rights and
subjected to atrocities (Lerner et.
al., 2006). They were also banned
from many public spaces, including temples, and prohibited from
interaction with members of higher
castes.
In the 20th century, India saw Dalit movements for caste
reform, and untouchability was abolished in the Indian Constitution in
1950 under the secular democratic
republic (Iyer, 2009). However, the
caste system has not yet been eradicated and remains deeply ingrained
in society today. In 1999, the Human Rights Watch reported that
over 160 million Dalit faced severe
discrimination and were still being
denied basic human rights such as
access to drinking water, education, and jobs (Lerner et. al.). There
has been a rise in violence despite
anti-untouchability acts and the
government’s official commitment
to equality. Cultural critic Rustom
Bharucha discusses the system’s
continuing presence in modern
society, “For whom is it possible to
elide the stigmas attached to a low
caste genealogy, heredity-determined
occupation, poverty, social ostracism,

Conclusion: Non-Oppressive
Ways of Knowing

I have presented but three
examples of how the practice of
epistemic violence has been used to
construct and maintain the Other.
Despite growing awareness and
support for the marginalized groups,
the idea of the Other has been
generationally ingrained in societal
epistemologies. In order to reverse
these fixed ideas, communities must
actively engage in the development
of non-oppressive ways of knowing
persons across different ethnicities,
religions, genders, and social positions. Feminist theory of epistemology recognizes the need for the
awareness of the ‘epistemic responsibility’ (Townley, 2006) held by both
the individual and groups in order
to overthrow the oppressive ways of
knowing that have been and are still
globally present. Those who ascribe
to this theory would suggest that
epistemologists need to take more
seriously issues of group differences
because the social hierarchies that
they often encourage can “both limit
the spheres of action available to
agents from non-privileged groups
and discourage those from privileged
groups from being accountable for
their actions when they seek and
claim knowledge” (Townley, 2006,
40).
While Francesco Caselli and
John Coleman suggest that ethnic
conflict automatically accompanies
visible group differences (Glaeser,
2005), I would argue that hatred
also arises between groups that
closely resemble each other, such as
between the upper and lower castes
in India. To this end, what is vital to
ending hatred between both visibly
different and visibly similar groups is
integration. As stated above, Glaeser
(2005) rightly posits that people will
investigate the truth behind propag-

ated stories if there is the perception
that they will benefit from putting
forth the effort. Greater integration
between groups could effectively deter the spread of hatred by creating a
demand for the correct information
and reducing the cost of searching
for it. The existence of group differences, instead of being used as a
crutch for marginalization, must be
used to justify extending the benefit
of the doubt (Rawls & David, 2003)
by giving these differences legitimacy
in their own right.
Often, those uninformed
will argue that minorities tend to
other themselves on the basis of
racial consciousness – failing to
recognize that this self-segregation is
generally the product of pre-existing
and historic patterns of discrimination (Bharucha, 2003). In the case
of the Romani, the self-imposed separateness comes not just from their
cultural beliefs, but also, and much
more prominently, from their history of slavery in the 16th through
19th centuries and policies of social
distancing established by their
European host societies (Hancock,
2005). It is evident, especially in
the example of the Romani people,
that “when people are systematically
excluded, or rendered in subordinate
roles, they are forced to erect boundaries of their own to create protected
situations that offer them the possibility of mutual reciprocity and trust
within those boundaries” (Rawls
& David, 2003, 471). This creates
a serious problem for democratic
societies in particular, as persons are
excluded from situated interactions
essential for the overall development
of a country’s economic, political,
and social transactions (Rawls &
David, 2003).
Though modern societies,
through technological advancements, are becoming increasingly
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and untouchability? These markers
of dalit identity continue to deepen even as the politics around this
identity are in the process of being
problematized and internationalized”
(Bharucha, 2003, 4240).
The historic othering of
Dalit is apparent even in the etymology of the term. Dalit can be traced
to the ancient language Sanskrit, in
which dal means to split or crack.
Dal in Hebrew means something
low, weak, and poor (Lerner et. al.,
2006). They are victims of discriminatory epistemic violence through
dehumanization as they are perceived to be subhuman and are the
targets of feelings of disgust and
contempt. A study run by social
psychologists Ifat Maoz and Clark
McCauley (2008) found that “dehumanization is an instigator of support for interethnic violence” (105).
Even within a society which endorses
democratic norms, the historic
discourse emphasizing out-group
dehumanization has continued to
legitimize aggression against the
vulnerable.
The Indian government is
reaching out to the Dalit in attempts to integrate them into society
through a policy of affirmative action. However, the epistemology of
violence is so profoundly entrenched
in societal thought and discourse
that higher castes are morally opposed to this policy, claiming that
it propagates reverse discrimination
(Iyer, 2009) and that it will lead to
brain drain as intellectuals leave the
country (Lerner et. al., 2006). Dalit
are victims of all three types of epistemic violence and until the public
discourse can change to include
Dalit voices as legitimate contributors, India will remain stratified.

16
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engaged and cohesive, old notions
of the segregated Other are still
prevalent through discourse and
generational education. It is for this
reason that integration must start
in the education systems. Drawing once again on Glaeser’s (2005)
cost-benefit analysis, if education
reduces the cost of learning the
truth, then less-educated individuals will have a higher likelihood of
accepting false hate-creating political
stories. There is a need for educators
to make use of post-structuralist
perspectives pioneered by Michel
Foucault, among others, in order to
address the diversity and situatedness
of oppression through teaching and
learning (Kumashiro, 2000). President of the National Association
for Multicultural Education, Kevin
Kumashiro (2000), defines two types
of knowledge which are harmful to
the Other. The first is knowledge
about only what society’s majority
defines as ‘normal’ and ‘normative’.
This causes what constitutes otherness to be known only by inference and comparison, which leads
to misconceptions. The second is
knowledge about the Other which
encourages a “distorted and misleading understanding of the Other that
is based on stereotypes and myths”
(Kumashiro, 2000, 32). In response,
he suggests the first approach to
addressing oppression is to improve
the experiences of those who are
othered through their inclusion in
the educational system. Many times,
the harm is not in the propagation of
biased knowledge but in an inaction
entirely. Kumashiro (2000) notes
that a number of researchers have
documented shockingly substandard
conditions in the educational institutions serving marginalized groups,
including unsafe buildings and
insufficient instructional material.
I would also argue that along with
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their integration into the education
systems, the marginalized students,
along with in-group students, need
to be provided with unbiased knowledge about the Other, and about the
legitimacy of different cultural practices. Education must also be used
to make available to the out-group
the language of self-representation.
This will allow them the possibility
of contestation, which is required for
non-domination (Fricker, 2013).
Overall, there needs to be an
effort made to cultivate an environment of responsible trust. This
implies that all epistemic agents
are treated with appropriate respect
(Townley, 2006). However, we must
assure that this is not taken advantage of by politicians and other
entrepreneurs of hate; we must avoid
exercising responsible trust blindly in
these situations. As a global society,
we need to start a new discourse
about the causes and results of epistemic violence. It is time to progress
past historic prejudices and protect
minorities from the damages done
by othering. They must be given the
right, as epistemic agents, to legitimacy in their practices and methods of
thought.
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